The ECOWAS Merger Control Regime: A New Chapter in Regional Competition Law

By Matthew Freer 

Introduction

The Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) marked a significant step toward deeper regional integration and market regulation with the formal activation of its merger control regime on 1 October 2024. This regime, now operational under the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (“ERCA”), brings a unified, supranational dimension to competition enforcement across the 15 ECOWAS member states. These member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.[1] This new framework aims to safeguard the regional market against anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, foster economic development, and ensure fair competition. It also positions ECOWAS among the growing number of African regional economic communities introducing comprehensive competition oversight mechanisms.

Established on 28 May 1975 through the Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was conceived to promote economic integration across the West African sub-region. Its initial vision was to foster a large economic and trading bloc through cooperation in industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, commerce, monetary and financial policy. Over time, ECOWAS has evolved to address broader governance issues, including political stability, security, and economic justice, making its merger control regime a natural extension of its mandate to build a fair and efficient regional economy.

Legal Foundations and Institutional Framework

The legal foundations and institutional framework for the ECOWAS merger control regime are built on a series of key legal instruments that establish the rules for competition within the region. The key foundational document is the Supplementary Act A/SA.1/12/08, adopted in 2008, which introduced the ECOWAS Competition Rules and established ERCA as the institutional mechanism to implement them.[2] This Act was followed by Regulation C/REG.23/12/21, which laid down the procedural rules for merger notification and review within the region.[3] In early 2024, Implementing Regulation No. 1/01/24 was promulgated to clarify notification thresholds, filing requirements, and review timelines.[4] These instruments collectively define the substantive and procedural contours of the regime and signal a shift toward rules-based governance of regional competition policy. 

Scope and Jurisdiction

The scope of the ECOWAS merger control regime is broad and designed to capture transactions with cross-border implications within the Community. The regime is both mandatory and suspensory in nature, meaning that parties must notify qualifying transactions and obtain clearance before implementation. Specifically, a merger must be notified if the parties involved operate in at least two ECOWAS member states and meet certain financial thresholds. The primary thresholds relate to turnover or asset value within the region: the combined turnover or relevant balance sheet total of the merging parties must exceed 20 million West African Units of Account (“WAUA”), roughly equivalent to $26.8 million, and at least two of the parties must individually exceed 5 million WAUA, or approximately $6.7 million.[5] Importantly, these thresholds are based on regional economic activity, rather than global figures, ensuring that the rules are directly tailored to the regional market context in which the member states operate. Still, companies operating primarily in a single large ECOWAS economy, such as Nigeria, may wonder whether regional thresholds fairly reflect domestic realities. 

Definition of Mergers and Control

Under the ECOWAS rules, the term “merger” includes a range of transactions such as acquisitions of control, the creation of joint ventures, or other forms of consolidation between entities.[6] “Control” is broadly defined to include not just the legal ownership of a majority of shares or voting rights but also de facto control—meaning the capacity to exert decisive influence over an enterprise’s strategic commercial behaviour.[7] In simpler terms, this means the ability to influence or decide a company’s major decisions and actions, even without owning it outright. This broad interpretation of control is similar to that used by both the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”) and South Africa, which consider influence beyond shareholding, including through management or policy direction.[8]This mirrors a growing understanding across Africa that control can be exerted in subtle but decisive ways, not unlike influence in boardrooms or state-linked enterprises.

Procedural Review Timelines

Once a notification is submitted, ERCA’s Executive Director is tasked with the initial review of the merger, which must be concluded within 60 working days. If further information is required, the Director may extend this deadline by another 30 working days. After the completion of the initial review, the ERCA Council is granted an additional 30 working days to make a final decision on the transaction. This period may be extended by a further 15 days where necessary. Therefore, the total possible days for a final decision from the date of the initial notification is 135 working days. Although the legislation provides these timelines, it does not clarify the frequency of Council meetings, raising possible questions about potential procedural delays and administrative backlog. 

Understandably, given the novelty of the regime, there is a risk that administrative capacity may initially lag behind its procedural ambitions—though this is a challenge that is likely to diminish as institutional experience and capacity builds over time.

Notification Fees and Enforcement Penalties

The financial obligations imposed on notifying parties also deserve attention. A notification fee is payable and may amount to 0.1% of the combined annual turnover or asset value—whichever is higher—of the companies involved within ECOWAS. This fee structure, notably, has no statutory ceiling, which could render compliance particularly costly for large-scale mergers. Such uncapped fees introduce a level of uncertainty into the merger planning process and may discourage investment or create disparities between firms of different sizes. Given this, it might be worth considering a sliding scale or a cap to ensure that start-ups and small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) are not unfairly burdened by compliance costs. Nevertheless, this mechanism reflects a growing trend among African competition authorities to align filing fees with the potential market impact of a transaction. 

If parties fail to notify a qualifying merger, or proceed with implementation before clearance is granted, ERCA may impose fines of up to 500,000 WAUA per day. These penalties, which equate to approximately $660,000 daily, are designed to ensure compliance and deter strategic non-disclosure.[9] This is notably harsher than COMESA’s flat $500,000 fine.[10] Such a stringent approach is consistent with the practices of more established jurisdictions and signals ERCA’s intent to enforce its mandate robustly. However, in a region where the ability to enforce regulations and the private sector’s understanding of competition law are still developing, this tough enforcement model could cause problems and require ongoing efforts to build capacity.

Substantive Assessment and Public Interest Considerations

In terms of substantive assessment, ERCA is empowered to block a merger that substantially lessens or is likely to substantially lessen competition within the ECOWAS common market. However, the authority also retains the discretion to approve otherwise anti-competitive mergers if they are deemed to serve a compelling public interest. This approach being similar to other African jurisdictions, particularly South Africa. Factors that may justify such exceptions include the promotion of socio-economic development, the protection of SMEs, and broader regional development goals.[11] This public interest override introduces a layer of flexibility to the competition assessment, but also demands careful balancing to ensure that economic efficiency is not sacrificed in pursuit of political or social objectives. Used wisely, this discretion can empower regional development—but overuse however could compromise the credibility of competition law as a neutral economic tool.

Appeals Mechanism and Judicial Review

The possibility of judicial review also reflects ECOWAS’s commitment to transparency and the rule of law. Parties aggrieved by ERCA’s decisions may appeal to the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This appeals mechanism is essential in safeguarding procedural fairness and offers a vital check on the Authority’s exercise of power.[12] However, the ECOWAS Court’s experience and ability to handle competition law cases are still developing, and it’s unclear how actively and effectively it will deal with these disputes. Building a body of jurisprudence will take time, but even a few early decisions could establish helpful precedent for future cases.

Emerging Challenges

Despite its promise, the implementation of the ECOWAS regime is not without its challenges. First among these is the potential for jurisdictional overlap with national competition authorities and with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (“UEMOA”), which also exercises competition law functions within several ECOWAS states. This duplication may result in regulatory uncertainty, forum shopping, and increased compliance costs for businesses operating in the region. In the East, COMESA faced similar early coordination challenges, and ECOWAS would do well to draw lessons from that experience in harmonising efforts with UEMOA. Moreover, the regime enters into force at a time of political uncertainty in West Africa, with three ECOWAS member states—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—currently suspended or in the process of exiting the Community. The regional political context may complicate the regime’s uniform application and threaten its credibility as a pan-West African legal instrument.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding these concerns, the ECOWAS merger control framework represents a landmark moment in the evolution of African competition policy. It brings the region into alignment with global and continental trends, offering a platform for increased regulatory convergence and cross-border cooperation. For legal practitioners and multinational corporations operating in the region, the message is clear: compliance with ECOWAS merger rules is no longer optional, and legal due diligence must include early engagement with ERCA’s requirements. While aspects of the regime may still require some clarification and refinement, particularly in relation to thresholds, procedures, and enforcement modalities, the overall architecture provides a strong foundation for fostering competitive regional markets.

The operationalisation of the ECOWAS merger control regime is a welcome development for those advocating deeper economic integration and regulatory harmonisation in West Africa. As the Authority gains experience and jurisprudence begins to develop, ERCA is likely to become a central actor in shaping the competitive landscape of the region. For this to succeed, continued engagement between regional institutions, national authorities, and the private sector will be essential. The challenge ahead lies not only in enforcing the rules but in embedding a culture of compliance and competition across ECOWAS’s diverse and dynamic member states. In time, perhaps ECOWAS could even serve as a model for other African regions where economic integration is still at a conceptual stage.


 

[2] Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Regulation C/REG.23/12/21 on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Competition Rules by the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (ERCA), December 2021

[3] Regulation C/REG 23/12/21 on the Rules of Procedure for Mergers and Acquisitions in ECOWAS

[4] Regulation C/REG.1/01/24 on the Procedural Manuals on Thresholds for Mergers and Acquisitions in ECOWAS. 

[5] Manual of Threshold for Mergers and Acquisitions and Threshold Indicating a Dominant and Monopolistic Position.

[6] Manual of Threshold for Mergers and Acquisitions and Threshold Indicating a Dominant and Monopolistic PositionAt page 3.

[7] Supplementary Act A/AS.1/12/08 Adopting Community Competition Rules and the Modalities of their Application within ECOWAS.

[8] COMESA Merger Guidelines (2014), sec. 2.3.

 

[10] COMESA Competition Rules, Art. 24.

[11] Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Regulation C/REG.23/12/21 on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Competition Rules by the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (ERCA), December 2021.

[12] ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (ERCA), Welcome to ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority, available at: https://www.arcc-erca.org/ (accessed 25 April 2025).

New Book Alert: “Regulating for Rivalry: The Development of Competition Regimes in Africa”

Book Launch Monday: CCRED’s latest covers AAT’s bread and butter, namely the rise of regulatory antitrust frameworks across the African continent.

The Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development (“CCRED”) has announced the launch of its latest publication: “Regulating for Rivalry: The Development of Competition Regimes in Africa”. Co-edited by Reena das Nair, Simon Roberts, and Jonathan Klaaren, this book looks to be a comprehensive compilation of cutting-edge research and analyses, bringing together the key papers presented at previous ACER Week (Annual Competition and Economic Regulation) conferences. It also includes contributions from CCRED’s ongoing work, reflecting a rich exchange of ideas aimed at fostering competitive markets and effective regulation across the African continent. 

One of the notable contributions in the book is a paper written by Primerio’s John Oxenham, Michael-James Currie, and Joshua Eveleigh, titled “Buyer Power in Emerging Markets: Assessing the Effectiveness of Regulatory Enforcement Developments in South Africa and Kenya”. This paper delves into the complex dynamics of buyer power, particularly in emerging markets, and evaluates the impact of recent regulatory enforcement efforts in South Africa and Kenya. Their research provides critical insights into the challenges and successes of regulatory buyer power within these key African economies, offering valuable lessons for policymakers and regulators across the continent. 

“Regulating for Rivalry” will be available in both digital and print formats towards the end of 2024. The book is expected to be an essential resource for academics, regulators, legal practitioners, and policymakers engaged in the development and enforcement of competition law in Africa. It showcases the growing maturity and innovation of competition regimes across the continent, highlighting the critical role of effective regulation in promoting economic development and inclusive growth. 

CCC Celebrates ’10’ — a Decade of COMESA Competition Law

Anniversary of CCC’s 2013 Creation to be Celebrated, Developments Discussed

Next week, African heads of state, ministers of trade and commerce, the secretary general of the 21-member state COMESA organization, Commissioners, and several heads of various competition agencies across the region, from Egypt to Eswatini & from Mauritius to Malawi, will join antitrust practitioners, legal experts, business people, and journalists in celebrating the occasion of the 10-year anniversary of the COMESA Competition Commission in Lilongwe, where the agency is headquartered.

Of course, AAT will be there to cover it.

As leaders of this august publication will know by now, our authors have followed the development of the CCC since its very beginning: from the nascent stages of having only a rudimentary staff and foundational rule documents, lacking sufficient guidance for practitioners and businesses alike, to the significant developmental stage under its first chief executive officer, Dr. Lipimile, who built out his enforcement team to coincide with the stellar growth of the CCC’s “one-stop-shop” merger notification statistics and attendant agency reviews (hiring economists and lawyers alike from across COMESA member nations) — and culminating, so far at least, in what we have come to call “CCC 2.0”: the latest iteration of the vastly successful multi-jurisdictional antitrust body, now led by its long-term member Dr. Willard Mwemba.

Under Mwemba’s aegis, the Commission has advanced well beyond a mere ‘rubber-stamping’ merger review body, as some had perceived the fledgling agency in its very early years (approx. 2013-15). The triple-C has since then begun to launch serious investigations into price-fixing, monopolization, attempted monopolization, gun-jumping, as well as market allocation schemes and secretly implemented transactions that parties had failed to notify.

While ‘antitrust is on our minds’, we note here for the record that, beyond its “competition” ambit that mostly remains in our focus at AAT, the CCC’s enforcement mission also includes a fairly large “consumer protection” brief, and the agency’s dedicated unit has investigated areas of consumer concern as broad as airline practices, imported faulty American baby powder, online ‘dark’ practices, pay-TV, and agricultural product quality disputes (milk and sugar come to mind) between Uganda and Kenya, to name only a few…

Our publication, together with several of the business journals and newspapers across the southeastern region of Africa, will report in great detail on the events, and possible news, to take place next week. Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio International:

“I look forward to hearing from these leaders themselves what they have accomplished in 10 years, and more importantly what they wish to accomplish in the near to mid-term future. In addition, I have a feeling that we may be treated to some truly newsworthy developments: I could imagine there being either confirmation or denials of the circulating rumour that the COMESA merger regime will soon become not only mandatory, but also suspensory. As most attorneys practicing in this arena know by now, the current Competition Regulations are not suspensory, which may be deemed too restrictive by the group’s Secretariat and its agency leadership in terms of its enforcement powers. After all, it is much more difficult to unscramble the egg than to never let it drop in the pan from the get-go!

Also, the CCC may reveal its plans in relation to a leniency programme for cartel conduct, which is plainly in order!”

Beyond that, Stargard surmises, participants at the almost week-long event may be treated to news about the CCC’s thoughts on digital markets, sectoral investigations, and the Commission’s upcoming “beyond-mere-merger” enforcement activities.

Upcoming Free Webinar: Risk & Investment in Africa

Hosted in partnership with Franklin Société d’avocats


When: 13 October 2021 at 15:00 CET/SAST (09:00 ET)
Where: Virtual
Registration: Click HERE to register (this event is free to attend)

About: Join Primerio and Franklin’s directors as they canvass a broad range of legal and regulatory risks in investing in Africa. This session will be held in both English and French.

Speakers: Jérôme Michel (Partner, Franklin); Joël Rault (Senior Advisor, Franklin); John Oxenham (Director, Primerio International); Lionel Lesur (Partner, Franklin); Andreas Stargard (Director, Primerio International)

R. Goerg | iStock | Getty Images

China tells Africa: ‘Monopolies bad!’

In an interesting twist, a representative of the last properly remaining centralised economy (the People’s Republic of China) has admonished African nations (specifically South Africa, where he acts as Ambassador) to enhance competition-law enforcement against dominant firms, including Western tech giants.

We observe that his statement is an “interesting” twist, because the Editor was taught over the years in several (perhaps faulty?) history lessons that the PRC itself had been inarguably heavily reliant on government-run monopoly companies for decades.

But let’s cut to the chase of what Mr. Xiaodong is actually saying: his thesis, not exactly ground-breaking in antitrust circles, can be summarised succinctly as “excessive power and influence of technology giants hinder innovation and competition and increases economic inequality.” There!

With regards to the applicability of his thesis to South Africa, the ambassador notes that “Antimonopoly practices also exist in SA. The control over data fees and food prices imposed by big corporations here has safeguarded consumers’ rights and interests. Monopolistic actions in the platform economy is also a matter of grave concern for SA’s Competition Commission. No country can turn a blind eye to the negative externality of the emerging digital economy.”

Image credit: Shutterstock

“Negative externalities…” sound very much like proper Western antitrust-economics-speak. Interesting. However, there is of course an ulterior motive behind this little lesson in competition economics from his excellency, the honorable ambassador. It comes at the end of his “opinion” piece: China would like to do more business in Africa, strengthen its ties, and deepen its influence (including in the area of education – beware!)… In the diplomat’s own words: “China’s high quality economic development brings greater opportunities for Africa’s development. … And China’s current cumulative investment in SA has exceeded $25bn, creating more than 400,000 jobs directly and indirectly in the region and making big contributions to SA’s economic and social development.”

Curious news, perhaps not so much any more after digging deeper. Especially when the interested reader googles (oh yes, coincidentally using that same FAANG company’s services that Mr. Xiadong’s diatribe indirectly disparages here) the simple search term “China – Africa“, the latest news from today’s South China Morning Post is that “China seeks to expand influence in Africa with more digital projects…” — nice coincidence.

Well, now readers of AAT know.

China wants to “share the achievements of digital technology with Africa to promote interconnectivity”

Competition Law Africa conference 2021 / this Tuesday

The Informa Competition Law Africa conference is back with a vengeance this year, albeit still held virtually due to the pandemic.

The overview can be found here, and the more detailed agenda here.

Speakers include South African enforcer Hardin Ratshisusu, COMESA chief Willard Mwemba, the OECD’s competition expert Frederic Jenny, Mahmoud Momtaz, head of the Egyptian competition authority, Lufuno Shinwana, senior legal counsel on competition issues for Anheuser-Busch Inbev, Ntokozo Mabhena, Anglo American’s Legal Advisor, and Maureen Mwanza, head of legal for the Zambian CCPC.

Primerio partner, Andreas Stargard, will host the afternoon panel on Vertical Restraints, interviewing Okikiola Litan, Senior Counsel, Commercial and Competition Law, with Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company.

Podcast explores latest developments across Africa

The latest episode #122 of Sheppard Mullin’s popular NOTA BENE podcast features Primerio’s Andreas Stargard, exploring “Africa Q2 Check In: Economic Growth and Relevance.”

Africa continues to strive for economic growth through various trade partnerships and foreign investments, but long-standing challenges remain an impediment in certain respects. Is Twitter’s decision to open an African base in #Ghana any indication of the continent’s economic potential? We’re joined by #Africa competition and markets expert, Andreas Stargard, a co-founding senior member of Primerio Ltd., as he shares insights on Africa’s economic outlook in Q2 of 2021.

You can listen to it for free on all major ‘podcatchers,’ including here:

Africa: Increased growth rates, innovative banking sector, investment vs. development aid

The above topics were among those discussed at this year’s #AfricaFinanceForum, hosted by the Corporate Council on Africa.  The annual event featured high-level speakers, such as Rhoda Weeks-Brown, IMF General Counsel, who pointed to increased expected economic growth rates of 3.5% in 2019 (half a point higher than in 2018) and a faster per-capita income rise in Africa  than in rest of the world.  “Also up for debate was the dichotomy of investment vs. development assistance as the key driver of economic development on the continent,” notes Andreas Stargard, who attended on behalf of Primerio Ltd.

Ms. Weeks-Brown noted the rise of pan-African (vs. purely domestic) banks, observing the added benefit of improved competition, as well as the steady rise of fintech on the continent. The latter is especially important as the continent is still under-banked and relies heavily on the informal sector (less than 20% of sub-Saharan Africa’s population has a bank account).  Yet Africa leads the world in mobile money.  Mr. Stargard noted that “[s]he and many other speakers on subsequent panels agreed that there was a delicate balance to be struck by regulators and legislators of weighing innovation against the proper level of FinTech regulation and its integration benefits against anti-competitive effects thereof.  The IMF attorney was careful to point out that banking & financial integration must grow in conjunction with, and to support, economic and trade integration, as financial stability is a public good.  Africa requires strong sector regulators that must remain free from undue political or industry interference.”

Kalidou Gadio, a lawyer at Manatt, provided a sanguine assessment of the state of banking in Africa, noting that it is not up to par globally, but better than it was a decade ago, before and during the financial crisis. He also pointed to the net positive effect of banks facing increasing competition from newcomers to the space, such as Orange, M-Pesa and other telecom firms.

Dr. Maxwell Opoku-Afari, First Deputy Governor of the national Bank of Ghana observed the difficulties in setting proper licensing rules for fintech companies by central banks, and commented on the concentration risk in banking.

Phumzile Langeni, special investment envoy of the RSA, gave an objective speech on the investment opportunities in South Africa, including the President’s FDI incentive programme.  She answered difficult questions with aplomb — for example those about the country’s land reforms, infrastructure troubles, and unemployment — and spoke of the enormous growth potential and the “youth dividend” in South Africa and the continent in general.

The half-day event was rounded out by a panel focussed on central banks’ handling of the unique foreign-exchange problems faced by certain African nations, notably Mozambique and Angola, whose central banks had representatives on the panel, including the issues of ForEx reserve allocation and pegged rates.

“Emerging Antitrust”: One size doesn’t fit all?

Pro rem publicam

At the Concurrences “Antitrust & Developing and Emerging Economies” conference held at NYU Law last Friday — and aptly sub-titled “Coping with nationalism, building inclusive growth” — the audience was treated to a (rather iconoclastic, yet fascinating) keynote speech by Nobel laureate economics professor Joe Stiglitz, which highlighted what would become a theme woven throughout the four panels of the day: One size does not fit all when it comes to competition-law regimes, according to a majority of the speakers; imposing a pure U.S. or EU-derived methodology without regard to local economic and/or political differences is doomed to fail.  However, as we outline further below, there were also countervailing voices…

Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz: “Revisit all of antitrust!”

In the words of Professor Stiglitz, his advice to developing nations was (perhaps to the chagrin of U.S. government representatives, such as the FTC’s international director, Randy Tritell): “don’t copy the US antitrust laws and presumptions!”  Smaller markets in developing countries are even more susceptible to market power by few large firms.  Competition law can be used in developing countries to advance the public interest, as there are fewer “tools in the toolkit” in those nations, and in his view, all available tools should thus be used.  He referred to the WalMart/Massmart transaction in South Africa in this regard, noting the public-interest conditions imposed there.

On the day’s Mega Mergers panel, SACC Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele noted how the outcomes of truly global “mega mergers” all having been positive, “there has been no outright prohibition, there really is no problem that’s too big which could not be remedied by the authorities and the parties.”

Andreas Stargard and Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele (South Africa)

Observes Andreas Stargard: “Commissioner Bonakele also pointed to the importance of international merger enforcers cooperating on remedies, in order to allow these positive outcomes to be maintained.  Taking up Professor Harry First’s hypothetical of a joint or ‘merged’ antitrust enforcement agency, Mr. Bonakele considered a combined merger authority for the African continent a possibility, especially in light of the many small jurisdictions which individually lack resources to police cross-border M&A activity.”  Mr. Bonakele expressed the concern that “the smaller, national enforcers certainly feel as if they cannot block a mega deal on their own, so they largely defer” to the established agencies, such as the EC and DOJ / FTC.

In response to Frederic Jenny’s critical introduction of the South African Competition Amendment Act, Commissioner Bonakele commented that the current legal regime lacked the ability to tackle concentration as a market feature in itself, whilst the SACC had a comparatively positive track record on unilateral enforcement issues.  Overall, he disagreed with the moderator that most of the Bill’s changes were drastic, stating simply that it would in fact bring South Africa more in line with other international regimes.

As to the ministerial intervention powers, he identified two concerns, namely the use of the agency’s resources as well as the possible risk of abuse by a minister who could employ the new law to pursue ulterior motives against a firm or a sector.

Counterpoint: public interest or politicization?

Prof. Ioannis Lianos characterized the “slightly fuzzy public interest test” as largely a scheme to enhance the bargaining power of the competition agencies that do apply such a test.

Canadian attorney and former enforcer Lawson Hunter pointed out that the trend of growing political interference in the merger approval process has spread globally, not only in developing nations but also in well-established regimes — often under the guise of national security reviews, which are “obscure, opaque in process, fundamentally political, and without any ‘there there’.”  Merger review has “simply become very broad and less doctrinal.”  “I found it interesting that Mr. Hunter recommended that other antitrust agencies should give more frank input into their sister agencies, if and when those stray from the right path,” said Stargard, who focuses his practice on competition matters across the continent.  “Hunter also pointed to the tendency in emerging antitrust jurisdictions to abuse the remedy process in merger control to address economic issues that lie well outside the actual competition concerns that may have been found — an issue we have also come across, sadly.”

Commissioner Bonakele closed the final panel of the day by addressing the recently ratified South African Competition Amendment Bill: he admitted that there were some “radical” provisions in the law, such as the power to break up companies, as well as the existence of a risk of government using the law’s new national security provision in a protectionist manner. He concluded by stating his personal worry that the law had possibly too much ambition, which could be difficult to implement in reality by the SACC.

The New South African Competition Amendment Bill – What it Means for Business

By Michael-James Currie currie2

Background

On 1 December 2017, the Minister of Economic Development (under whose auspices the South African competition authorities fall), Ebrahim Patel, published draft amendments to the South African Competition Act [PDF], 89 of 1998 (Act) for public comment.

The proposed amendments (Amendments) to the Act, which principally aim to address concentration in the market, go well beyond pure competition issues and bestow a significant public-interest mandate on the competition authorities.

In this regard, Minister Patel has remarked that the old, i.e., current, Act “was focused mainly on the conduct of market participants rather than the structure of markets, and while this was part of industrial policy, there was room for competition legislation as well”.

south_africaPatel’s influence in advancing his industrial-policy objectives through the utilisation of the public-interest provisions in merger control are well documented. AAT contributors have written about the increasing trend by the competition authorities in merger control to impose public-interest conditions that go well beyond merger specificity – often justified on the basis of the Act’s preamble which, inter alia, seeks to promote a more inclusive economy.  The following extracts from the introduction to the Amendments indicate a similar, if not more expansive, role for public interest considerations in competition law enforcement:

“…the explicit reference to these structural and transformative objectives in the Act clearly  indicates that the legislature intended that competition policy should be broadly framed, embracing both traditional competition issues, as well as these explicit transformative public interest goals”.

The draft Bill focuses on creating and enhancing the substantive provisions of the Act aimed at addressing two key structural challenges in the South African economy: concentration and the racially-skewed spread of ownership of firms in the economy.

The role of public interest provisions in merger control have often been criticised, predominantly on the basis that once the agencies move away from competition issues and merger specificity and seek conditions that go beyond that which is strictly necessary to remedy any potential negative effects, one moves away from an objective standard by which to assess mergers. This leads to a negative impact on costs, timing and certainty – essential factors for potential investors considering entering or expanding into a market.

As John Oxenham, director of Pr1merio states, “from a policy perspective it is apparent that consumer-welfare tests have been frustrated by uncertainty”. In this regard, the South African authorities initially adopted a position in terms of which competition law played a primary role, with public-interest considerations taking second place.  Largely owing to Minister Patel’s intervention, the agencies have recently taken a more direct approach to public-interest considerations and have effectively elevated the role of public-interest considerations to the same level as pure competition matters – particularly in relation to merger control (although we have seen a similar influence of public-interest considerations in, inter alia, market inquiries and more recently in the publishing of industry Codes of Conduct, e.g., in the automotive aftermarkets industry).

Minister Patel speaks
Minister Patel speaks

The current amendments, however, risk elevating public-interest provisions above those of competition issues. The broad remedies and powers which the competition agencies may impose absent any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour are indicative of the competition agencies moving into an entirely new ‘world of enforcement’ in what could very likely be a significant ‘over-correction’ on the part of Minister Patel, at the cost of certainty and the likely deleterious impact on investment.

The proposed Amendments, which we unpack below, seem to elevate industrial policies above competition related objectives thereby introducing a significant amount of discretion on behalf of the agencies. Importantly, the Amendments are a clear departure from the general internationally accepted view that that ‘being big isn’t bad’, but competition law is rather about how you conduct yourself in the market place.

The Proposed Amendments

The Amendments identify five key objectives namely:

(i) The provisions of the Competition Act relating to prohibited practices and mergers must be strengthened.

(ii) Special attention must be given to the impact of anti-competitive conduct on small businesses and firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons.

(iii) The provisions relating to market inquiries must be strengthened so that their remedial actions effectively address market features and conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition in the relevant markets.

(iv) It is necessary to promote the alignment of competition-related processes and decisions with other public policies, programmes and interests.

(v) The administrative efficacy of the competition regulatory authorities and their processes must be enhanced.

At the outset, it may be worth noting that the Amendments now cater for the imposition of an administrative penalty for all contraventions of the Act (previously, only cartel conduct, resale price maintenance and certain abuse of dominance conduct attracted an administrative penalty for a first-time offence).

Secondly, the Amendments envisage that an administrative penalty may be imposed on any firm which forms part of a single economic entity (in an effort to preclude firms from setting up corporate structures to avoid liability).

We summarise below the key proposed Amendments to the Competition Act.

Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions

Excessive pricing

  • The evidentiary onus will now be on the respondent to counter the Competition Commission’s (Commission) prima facie case of excessive pricing against it.
  • The removal of the current requirement that an “excessive price” must be shown to be to the “detriment of consumers” in order to sustain a complaint.
  • An obligation on the Commission to publish guidelines to determine what constitutes an “excessive price”.

Predatory Pricing

  • The introduction of a standard which benchmarks against the respondents own “cost benchmarking” as opposed to the utilisation of more objective standards tests.
  • The benchmarking now includes reference to “average avoidable costs” or “long run average incremental costs” (previously the Act’s only tests were marginal costs and average variable costs).

General Exclusionary Conduct

  • The current general exclusionary conduct provision, Section 8(c), will be replaced by an open list of commonly accepted forms of exclusionary conduct as identified in Section 8(d).
  • The definition of exclusionary conduct will include not only “barriers to entry and expansion within a market, but also to participation in a market”.
  • The additional forms of abusive conduct will be added to Section 8(d):
    • prevent unreasonable conditions unrelated to the object of a contract being placed on the seller of goods or services”;
    • Section 8(1)(d)(vii) is inserted to include the practice of engaging in a margin squeeze as a possible abuse of dominance;
    • Section (1)(d)(viii) is introduced to protect suppliers to dominant firms from being required, through the abuse of dominance, to sell their goods or services at excessively low prices. This addresses the problem of monopsonies, namely when a customer enjoys significant buyer power over its suppliers”.

Price Discrimination

  • The Amendment will look to expand Section 9 of the Act to prohibit price discrimination by a dominant firm against its suppliers.
  • An onus of proof has been shifted on to the respondent to demonstrate that any price discrimination does not result in a substantial lessening of competition.

Merger-Control Provisions

  • Introduction of certain mandatory disclosures relating, in particular, to that of cross-shareholding or directorship between the merging parties and other third parties.
  • Introduction of provisions which essentially allow the competition authorities to treat a number of smaller transactions (which fell below the merger thresholds), which took place within three years, as a single merger on the date of the latest transaction.
  • Introduction of additional public-interest grounds which must be taken into account when assessing the effects of a merger. These relate to “ownership, control and the support of small businesses and firms owned or controlled by historically disadvantaged persons”.

Market Inquiries

  • Granting the Commission powers to make orders or impose remedies (including forced divestiture recommendations which must be approved by the Tribunal) following the conclusion of a market inquiry (previously the Commission was only empowered to make recommendations to Parliament).
  • The introduction of a new competition test for market inquiries, namely whether any feature or combination of features in a market that prevents, restricts or distorts competition in that market constitutes an “adverse effect” (a significant departure from the traditional “substantial lessening of competition” test).
  • Focussed market inquiries are envisaged to replace the “Complex Monopoly” provisions which were promulgated in 2009 but not yet brought into effect.

Additional Amendments

  • Empowering the Commission to grant leniency to any firm.
  • This is a departure from the current leniency policy, under which the Commission is only permitted to grant leniency to the ‘first through the door’.

What does this all mean going forward?

The above proposed amendments are not exhaustive. In addition to above, it is apparent that Minister Patel envisages utilising the competition agencies and Act as a “one-stop-shop” in order to address not only competition issues but facilitate increased transformation within the industry and to promote a number of additional socio-economic objectives (i.e., to bring industrial policies within the remit of the competition agencies).

In a move which would may undermine the independence and impartiality of the competition agencies, the Amendment also intends providing the responsible “Minister with more effective means of participating in competition-related inquiries, investigations and adjudicative processes”.

The amendments also strengthen the available interventions that will be undertaken to redress the specific challenges posed by concentration and untransformed ownership”.

Competition-law observers interviewed by AAT point out that the principle of separation of powers is a fundamental cornerstone of the South African constitutional democracy and is paramount in ensuring that there is an appropriate ‘checks and balances’ system in place. It is for this reason that the judiciary (which in this context includes the competition agencies) must remain independent, impartial and act without fear or favour (as mandated in terms of the Act).

The increased interventionist role which the executive is envisaged to play, by way of the Amendments, in the context of competition law enforcement raises particular concerns in this regard.  Furthermore, the increased role of public-interest considerations effectively confers on the competition agencies the responsibility of determining the relevant ambit, scope and enforcement of socio-economic objectives. These are broad, subjective and may be vastly different depending on whether one is assessing these non-competition objectives in the short or long term.

Any uncertainty regarding the relevant factors which the competition authorities ought to take into account or whose views the authorities will be prepared to afford the most weight too, risks trust being lost in the objectivity and impartiality of the enforcement agencies. This will have a direct negative impact on the Government’s objective in selling South Africa as an investor friendly environment.

In addition, as Primerio attorney and competition counsel Andreas Stargard notes, the “future role played by the SACC’s market inquiries” is arguably open to significant abuse, as “the Competition Commission has broad discretion to impose robust remedies, even absent any evidence of a substantial lessening of competition.”

  • Mr. Stargard notes that the draft Amendment Bill, in its own words in section 43D (clause 21) “places a duty on the Commission to remedy structural features identified as having an adverse effect on competition in a market, including the use of divestiture orders. It also requires the Commission to record its reasons for the identified remedy. … These amendments empower the Commission to tailor new remedies demanded by the findings of the market inquiry. These remedies can be creative and flexible, constrained only by the requirements that they address the adverse effect on competition established by the market inquiry, and are reasonable and practicable.”

Andreas Stargard
Andreas Stargard

Although the Amendments recognise that concentration in of itself is not in all circumstances to be construed as an a priori negative, the lack of a clear and objective set of criteria together with the lower threshold (i.e., “adverse effect”) which must be met before the competition authorities may impose far-reaching remedies, coupled with the interventionist role which the executive may play (particularly in relation to market inquiries), may have a number of deterrent effects on both competition and investment.

Mr. Stargard notes in this regard that the “approach taken by the new draft legislation may in fact stifle innovation, growth, and an appetite for commercial expansion, thereby counteracting the express goals listed in its preamble:  Firms that are currently sitting at a market share of around 30% for instance may not be incentivised to obtain any greater accretive share for fear of being construed as holding a dominant market position, once the 35% threshold is crossed“.

The objectives to facilitate a spread of ownership is not a novel objective of the post-Apartheid government and a number of pieces of legislation and policies have been introduced in order to facilitate the entry of small previously disadvantaged players into the market through agencies generally better equipped to deal with this. These policies, in general, have arguably not led to the government’s envisaged benefits. There may be a number of reasons for this, but the new Amendments do not seek to address the previous failures or identify why various other initiatives and pieces of legislation such as the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation has not worked (to the extent envisaged by Government). Furthermore, the Tribunal summed up this potential conflict neatly in the following extract in the Distillers case:

Thus the public interest asserted pulls us in opposing directions. Where there are other appropriate legislative instruments to redress the public interest, we must be cognisant of them in determining what is left for us to do before we can consider whether the residual public interest, that is that part of the public interest not susceptible to or better able to be dealt with under another law, is substantial.”

Perhaps directing the substantial amount of tax payers’ money away from a certain dominant state-owned Airline – which has been plagued with maladministration – and rather use those funds to invest in small businesses will be a better solution to grow the economy and spread ownership to previously disadvantaged groups than potentially prejudicing dominant firms which are in fact efficient.

Furthermore, ordering divestitures requires that there be a suitable third party who could effectively take up the divested business and impose a competitive constraint on the dominant entity. It seems inevitable that based on the proposed Amendments the competition authorities will be placed in the invidious position of considering a divestiture to an entity which may not yet have proven any successful track record. The Amendments do not provide guidance for this and although the competition authorities have the necessary skills and resources to assess whether conduct has an anti-competitive effect on the market, it is less clear whether the authorities have the necessary skills to properly identify a suitable third party acquirer of a divested business.

In addition and importantly, promoting competition within the market achieves public interest objectives. Likewise, anything which undermines competition in the market will have a negative impact on the public interest considerations.

John Oxenham
John Oxenham

As John Oxenham and Patrick Smith have argued elsewhere, “competition drives a more efficient allocation of resources, resulting in lower prices and better quality products for customers. Lower prices typically result in an expansion of output. Output expansion, combined with the effect of lower prices in respect of one good or service frees up resources to be spent in other areas of the economy. The result is likely to be higher output and, most importantly for emerging economies, employment”.

While it is true that ordinarily, a decrease in concentration and market power should result in an increase in employment we have not seen a comprehensive assessment of the negative costs associated with pursuing public interest objectives. Any weakening of a pure competition test must imply some costs in terms of lost efficiency, or less competitive outcome, which is justified based on a party’s perspective of a particular public interest factor. That loss in efficiency and less competitive outcome is very likely to have negative consequences for consumers, growth, and employment. Accordingly, the pursuit of “public-interest factors” might have some component of a loss to the public interest itself. We have not seen that loss in efficiency (and resultant harm to the public interest, as comprehensively understood) meaningfully acknowledged in the proposed Amendments.

A further risk to the broad and open ended role which public interest considerations are likely to play in competition law matters should the Amendments be passed is a significant risk of interventionism by third parties (in particular, competitors, Trade Unions and Government) who may look to utilise the Act to simply to harass competitors rather than pursue legitimate pro-competition objectives. The competition authorities will need to be extra mindful of the delays, costs and uncertainty which opportunistic intervention may lead to.

Although there are certain aspects of the Amendments which are welcomed, such as limiting the timeline of market inquiries, from a policy perspective the Amendments appear to go far beyond consumer protection issues in an effort to address certain socio-economic disparities in the South African economy, and may, in fact very likely hinder the development of the economy.

Based on the objectives which underpin the Amendments, it appears as if the Department of Economic Development is focused on dividing the existing ‘economic pie’ rather than on growing it for the benefit of all South Africans.

From a competition law enforcement perspective, however, firms conducting business in South Africa are likely to see a significant shake-up should the Amendments be brought into effect as a number of markets have been identified as highly concentrated (including, Communication Energy, Financial Services, Food and agro-processing, Infrastructure and construction, Intermediate industrial products, Mining, Pharmaceuticals and Transport).

[To contact any of the contributors to this article, or should you require any further information regarding the Amendment Bill, you are welcome to contact the AAT editors at editor@africanantitrust.com]